In the context of China's critical economic transition towards sustainability, this research employs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving government, enterprises, and environmental protection social organizations to investigate the evolutionary trajectory of enterprises' green production behaviors. By elucidating the equilibrium solution of the model and validating its local stability, the study aims to identify the key factors that contribute to steering the game towards a favorable state. The findings reveal that enterprises' decisions to adopt green production practices are primarily driven by cost-benefit considerations. Meanwhile, government interventions in regulating green production are influenced by factors such as resource input, punitive measures for non-compliance, and reward incentives. Additionally, the decisions of environmental protection social organizations to monitor enterprises' green production are shaped by factors like cost, financial support, and subsidy incentives. Ultimately, the study provides policy recommendations, emphasizing stakeholder perspectives, to encourage corporate green production. These insights not only aim to foster sustainable development among enterprises but also serve as a theoretical foundation for government policy formulation.